Bidding Mechanisms in Graph Games by Avni, Guy et al.
Bidding Mechanisms in Graph Games
Guy Avni
IST Austria, Austria
guy.avni@ist.ac.at
Thomas A. Henzinger
IST Austria, Austria
tah@ist.ac.at
Ðorđe Žikelić
IST Austria, Austria
djordje.zikelic@ist.ac.at
Abstract
In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce a finite or
infinite path, which determines the qualitative winner or quantitative payoff of the game. We study
bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Several bidding rules were
studied previously. In Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and
the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is similar except
that the winner of the bidding pays the “bank” rather than the other player. Taxman bidding
spans the spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding. They are parameterized by a constant
τ ∈ [0, 1]: portion τ of the winning bid is paid to the other player, and portion 1− τ to the bank.
While finite-duration (reachability) taxman games have been studied before, we present, for the first
time, results on infinite-duration taxman games. It was previously shown that both Richman and
poorman infinite-duration games with qualitative objectives reduce to reachability games, and we
show a similar result here. Our most interesting results concern quantitative taxman games, namely
mean-payoff games, where poorman and Richman bidding differ significantly. A central quantity in
these games is the ratio between the two players’ initial budgets. While in poorman mean-payoff
games, the optimal payoff of a player depends on the initial ratio, in Richman bidding, the payoff
depends only on the structure of the game. In both games the optimal payoffs can be found using
(different) probabilistic connections with random-turn based games in which in each turn, instead of
bidding, a coin is tossed to determine which player moves. While the value with Richman bidding
equals the value of a random-turn based game with an un-biased coin, with poorman bidding, the
bias in the coin is the initial ratio of the budgets. We give a complete classification of mean-payoff
taxman games that is based on a probabilistic connection: the value of a taxman bidding game with
parameter τ and initial ratio r, equals the value of a random-turn based game that uses a coin with
bias F (τ, r) = r+τ ·(1−r)1+τ . Thus, we show that Richman bidding is the exception; namely, for every
τ < 1, the value of the game depends on the initial ratio. Our proof technique simplifies and unifies
the previous proof techniques for both Richman and poorman bidding.
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1 Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are a central class of games in formal verification
[2], where they are used, for example, to solve synthesis [18], and they have deep connections
to foundations of logic [20]. A graph game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex in the
graph, which the players move throughout the graph to produce an infinite path (“play”) pi.
The game is zero-sum and pi determines the winner or payoff. Graph games can be classified
according to the players’ objectives. For example, the simplest objective is reachability, where
Player 1 wins iff an infinite path visits a designated target vertex. Another classification of
graph games is the mode of moving the token. The most studied mode of moving is turn
based, where the players alternate turns in moving the token.
In bidding games, in each turn, an “auction” is held between the two players in order to
determine which player moves the token. The bidding mode of moving was introduced in
[13, 14] for reachability games, where the following bidding rules where defined. In Richman
bidding (named after David Richman), each player has a budget, and before each turn, the
players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available
budget. The player who bids higher wins the bidding, pays the bid to the other player, and
moves the token. A second bidding rule called poorman bidding in [13], is similar except that
the winner of the bidding pays the “bank” rather than the other player. Thus, the bid is
deducted from his budget and the money is lost. A third bidding rule on which we focus in
this paper, called taxman in [13] spans the spectrum between poorman and Richman bidding.
Taxman bidding is parameterized by τ ∈ [0, 1]: the winner of a bidding pays portion τ of his
bid to the other player and portion 1− τ to the bank. Taxman bidding with τ = 1 coincides
with Richman bidding and taxman bidding with τ = 0 coincides with poorman bidding.
Bidding games are relevant for several communities in Computer Science. In formal
methods, graph games are used to reason about systems. Poorman bidding games naturally
model concurrent systems where processes pay the scheduler for moving. Block-chain
technology like Etherium is an example of such a system, which is a challenging to formally
verify [9, 3]. In Algorithmic Game Theory, auction design is a central research topic that
is motivated by the abundance of auctions for online advertisements [16]. Infinite-duration
bidding games can model ongoing auctions and can be used to devise bidding strategies for
objectives like: “In the long run, an advertiser’s ad should show at least half of the time”.
In Artificial Intelligence, bidding games with Richman bidding have been used to reason
about combinatorial negotiations [15]. Finally, discrete-bidding games [11], in which the
granularity of the bids is restricted by assuming that the budgets are given using coins, have
been studied mostly for recreational games, like bidding chess [6].
Both Richman and poorman infinite-duration games have a surprising, elegant, though
different, mathematical structure as we elaborate below. Our study of taxman bidding aims
at a better understanding of this structure and at shedding light on the differences between
the seemingly similar bidding rules.
A central quantity in bidding games is the initial ratio of the players budgets. Formally,
assuming that, for i ∈ {1, 2}, Player i’s initial budget is Bi, we say that Player 1’s initial
ratio is B1/(B1 +B2). The central question that was studied in [13] regards the existence of
a necessary and sufficient initial ratio to guarantee winning the game. Formally, the threshold
ratio in a vertex v, denoted Th(v), is such that if Player 1’s initial ratio exceeds Th(v), he can
guarantee winning the game, and if his initial ratio is less than Th(v), Player 2 can guarantee
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winning the game1. Existence of threshold ratios in reachability games for all three bidding
mechanisms was shown in [13].
Richman reachability games have an interesting probabilistic connection [14]. To state
the connection, we first need to introduce random-turn based games. Let p ∈ [0, 1]. In a
random-turn based game that is parameterized by p, in each turn, rather than bidding, the
player who moves is chosen by throwing a (possibly) biased coin: with probability p, Player 1
chooses how to move the token, and with probability 1− p, Player 2 chooses. Formally, a
random-turn based game is a special case of a stochastic game [10]. Consider a Richman game
G. We construct a “uniform” random-turn based game on top of G, denoted RTB0.5(G), in
which we throw an unbiased coin in each turn. The objective of Player 1 remains reaching his
target vertex. It is well known that each vertex in RTB0.5(G) has a value, which is, informally,
the probability of reaching the target when both players play optimally, and which we denote
by val(RTB0.5(G), v). We are ready to state the probabilistic connection: For every vertex v
in the Richman game G, the threshold ratio in v equals 1 − val(RTB(G), v). We note that
such a connection is not known and is unlikely to exist in reachability games with neither
poorman nor taxman bidding. Random-turn based games have been extensively studied in
their own right, mostly with unbiased coin tosses, since the seminal paper [17].
Infinite-duration bidding games have been recently studied with Richman [4] and poorman
[5] bidding. For qualitative objectives, namely games in which one player wins and the other
player loses, both bidding rules have similar properties. By reducing general qualitative
games to reachability games, it is shown that threshold ratios exist for both types of bidding
rules. We show a similar result for qualitative games with taxman bidding.
Things get interesting in mean-payoff games, which are quantitative games: an infinite
play has a payoff, which is Player 1’s reward and Player 2’s cost (see an example of a
mean-payoff game in Figure 1). We thus call the players in a mean-payoff game Max and
Min, respectively. We focus on games that are played on strongly-connected graphs. With
Richman bidding [4], the initial budget of the players does not matter: A mean-payoff game
G has a value c ∈ IR that depends only on the structure of the game such that Min can
guarantee a cost of at most c with any positive budget, and with any positive budget, Max
can guarantee a payoff of at least c− , for every  > 0. Moreover, the value c of G equals
the value of a random-turn based game RTB0.5(G) that is constructed on top of G. Since G is
a mean-payoff game, RTB0.5(G) is a mean-payoff stochastic game, and its value, which again,
is a well-known concept, is the expected payoff when both players play optimally.
Poorman mean-payoff games have different properties. Unlike with Richman bidding,
the value of the game depends on the initial ratio. That is, with a higher initial ratio,
Max can guarantee a better payoff. More surprisingly, poorman mean-payoff games have a
probabilistic connection, which is in fact richer than for Richman bidding. This is surprising
since poorman reachability games do not have a probabilistic connection and reachability
games tend to be simpler than mean-payoff games. The connection for poorman games is the
following: Suppose Max’s initial ratio is r ∈ [0, 1] in a game G. Then, the value in G with
respect to r is the value of the random-turn based game RTBr(G) in which in each turn, we
toss a biased coin that chooses Max with probability r and Min with probability 1− r.
Given this difference between the two bidding rules, one may wonder how do mean-payoff
taxman games behave, since these bidding rules span the spectrum between Richman and
1 When the initial ratio is exactly Th(v), the winner depends on the mechanism with which ties are
broken. Our results do not depend on a specific tie-breaking mechanism.Tie-breaking mechanisms are
particularly important in discrete-bidding games [1].
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2 −1 −1 −2
v1 v2 v3 v4
Figure 1 On the left, a mean-payoff game G. On the right, the mean-payoff value of G, where
the initial ratio is fixed to 0.75 and the taxman parameter τ varies. The value of G with Richman
bidding is −0.5, with poorman bidding, it is 1, and, for example, with τ = 0.2, it is 0.533.
poorman bidding. Our main contribution is a complete solution to this question: we identify
a probabilistic connection for a taxman game G that depends on the parameter τ of the
bidding and the initial ratio r. That is, we show that the value of the game equals the value
of the random-turn based game RTBF (τ,r)(G), where F (τ, r) = r+τ ·(1−r)1+τ . The construction
gives rise to optimal strategies w.r.t. τ and the initial ratio. As a sanity check, note that
for τ = 1, we have F (τ, r) = 0.5, which agrees with the result on Richman bidding, and for
τ = 0, we have F (τ, r) = r, which agrees with the result on poorman bidding. In Figure 1,
we depict some mean-payoff values for a fixed initial ratio and varying taxman parameter.
Previous results only give the two endpoints in the plot, and the mid points in the plot are
obtained using the results in this paper.
The main technical challenge is constructing an optimal strategy for Max. The construc-
tion involves two components. First, we assign an “importance” to each vertex v, which we
call strength and denote St(v). Intuitively, if St(v) > St(u), then it is more important for
Max to move in v than in u. Second, when the game reaches a vertex v, Max’s bid is a careful
normalization of St(v) so that changes in Max’s ratio are matched with the accumulated
weights in the game. Finding the right normalization is intricate and it consists of the main
technical contribution of this paper. Previous such normalizations were constructed for
Richman and poorman mean-payoff games [4, 5]. The construction for Richman bidding is
much more complicated than the one we present here. The construction for poorman bidding
is ad-hoc and does not generalize. Our construction for taxman bidding thus unifies these
constructions and simplifies them. It uses techniques that can generalize beyond taxman
bidding. Finally, we study, for the first time, complexity problems for taxman games.
Due to lack of space, some proofs appear in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
A graph game is played on a directed graph G = 〈V,E〉, where V is a finite set of vertices
and E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges. The neighbors of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted N(v), is the
set of vertices {u ∈ V : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E}. A path in G is a finite or infinite sequence of vertices
v1, v2, . . . such that for every i ≥ 1, we have 〈vi, vi+1〉 ∈ E.
Bidding games Each Player i has a budget Bi ∈ IR≥0. In each turn a bidding determines
which player moves the token. Both players simultaneously submit bids, where a bid bi for
Player i is legal if bi ≤ Bi. The player who bids higher wins the bidding, where we assume
some mechanism to break ties, e.g., always giving Player 1 the advantage, and our results are
not affected by the specific tie-breaking mechanism at use. The winner moves the token and
pays his bid, where we consider three bidding mechanisms that differ in where the winning
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bid is paid. Suppose Player 1 wins a bidding with his bid of b.
In Richman bidding, the winner pays to the loser, thus the new budgets are B1 − b and
B2 + b.
In poorman bidding, the winner pays to the bank, thus the new budgets are B1 − b and
B2.
In taxman bidding with parameter τ ∈ [0, 1], the winner pays portion τ to the other
player and (1− τ) to the bank, thus the new budgets are B1 − b and B2 + (1− τ) · b.
A central quantity in bidding games is the ratio of a player’s budget from the total budget.
I Definition 1. (Ratio) Suppose the budget of Player i is Bi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, at some point
in the game. Then, Player i’s ratio is Bi/(B1 +B2). The initial ratio refers to the ratio of
the initial budgets, namely the budgets before the game begins. We restrict attention to games
in which both players start with positive initial budgets, thus the initial ratio is in (0, 1).
Strategies and plays A strategy is a recipe for how to play a game. It is a function
that, given a finite history of the game, prescribes to a player which action to take, where
we define these two notions below. For example, in turn-based games, a strategy takes as
input, the sequence of vertices that were visited so far, and it outputs the next vertex to
move to. In bidding games, histories and strategies are more involved as they maintain the
information about the bids and winners of the bids. Formally, a history in a bidding game
is pi = 〈v1, b1, i1〉, . . . , 〈vk, bk, ik〉, vk+1 ∈ (V × IR× {1, 2})∗ · V , where for 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, the
token is placed on vertex vj at round j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the winning bid is bj and the winner
is Player ij . Consider a finite history pi. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Wi(pi) ⊆ {1, . . . , k} denote the
indices in which Player i is the winner of the bidding in pi. Let BIi be the initial budget of
Player i. Player i’s budget following pi, denoted Bi(pi), depends on the bidding mechanism.
For example, in Richman bidding, B1(pi) = BIi −
∑
j∈W1(pi) bj +
∑
j∈W2(pi) bj , B2 is defined
dually, and the definition is similar for taxman and poorman bidding. Given a history pi that
ends in v, a strategy for Player i prescribes an action 〈b, v〉, where b ≤ Bi(pi) is a bid that
does not exceed the available budget and v is a vertex to move to upon winning, where we
require that v is a neighbor of vk+1. An initial vertex, initial budgets, and two strategies for
the players determine a unique infinite play pi for the game. The vertices that pi visits form
an infinite path path(pi).
Objectives An objective O is a set of infinite paths. Player 1 wins an infinite play pi iff
path(pi) ∈ O. We call a strategy f winning for Player 1 w.r.t. an objective O if for every
strategy g of Player 2 the play that f and g determine is winning for Player 1. Winning
strategies for Player 2 are defined dually. We consider the following qualitative objectives:
1. In reachability games, Player 1 has a target vertex t and an infinite play is winning iff it
visits t.
2. In parity games, each vertex is labeled with an index in {1, . . . , d}. An infinite path is
winning for Player 1 iff the parity of maximal index visited infinitely often is odd.
3. Mean-payoff games are played on weighted directed graphs, with weights given by a
function w : V → Q. Consider an infinite path η = v1, v2, · · · ∈ V ω. For n ∈ IN, the
prefix of length n of η is ηn, and we define its energy to be E(ηn) =
∑n
i=1 w(vi). The
payoff of η is MP(η) = lim infn→∞E(ηn)/n. Player 1 wins η iff MP(η) ≥ 0.
Mean-payoff games are quantitative games. We think of the payoff as Player 1’s reward
and Player 2’s cost, thus in mean-payoff games, we refer to Player 1 as Max and to Player 2
as Min.
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Threshold ratios The first question that arrises in the context of bidding games asks
what is the necessary and sufficient initial ratio to guarantee an objective.
I Definition 2. (Threshold ratios) Consider a bidding game G, a vertex v, an initial ratio
r, and an objective O for Player 1. The threshold ratio in v, denoted Th(v), is a ratio in
[0, 1] such that if r > Th(v), then Player 1 has a winning strategy that guarantees that O is
satisfied, and if r < Th(v), then Player 2 has a winning strategy that violates O.
Random turn-based games A stochastic game [10] is a graph game in which the vertices
are partitioned between two players and a nature player. As in turn-based games, whenever
the game reaches a vertex that is controlled by Player i, for i = 1, 2, he choses how the game
proceeds, and whenever the game reaches a vertex v that is controlled by nature, the next
vertex is chosen according to a probability distribution that depends only on v.
Consider a bidding game G that is played on a graph 〈V,E〉. The random-turn based game
with ratio r ∈ [0, 1] that is associated with G is a stochastic game that intuitively simulates
the following process. In each turn we throw a biased coin that turns heads with probability
r and tails with probability 1− r. If the coin turns heads, then Player 1 moves the token,
and otherwise Player 2 moves the token. Formally, we define RTBr(G) = 〈V1, V2, VN , E,Pr〉,
where each vertex in V is split into three vertices, each controlled by a different player, thus
for α ∈ {1, 2, N}, we have Vα = {vα : v ∈ V }, nature vertices simulate the fact that Player 1
chooses the next move with probability r, thus Pr[vN , v1] = r = 1− Pr[vN , v2], and reaching
a vertex that is controlled by one of the two players means that he chooses the next move,
thus E = {〈vα, uN 〉 : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E and α ∈ {1, 2}}. When G is a mean-payoff game, the vertices
are weighted and we define the weights of v1, v2, and vN to be equal to the weight of v.
The following definitions are standard, and we refer the reader to [19] for more details. A
strategy in a stochastic game is similar to a turn-based game; namely, given the history of
vertices visited so far, the strategy chooses the next vertex. Fixing two such strategies f and
g for both players gives rise to a distribution D(f, g) on infinite paths. Intuitively, Player 1’s
goal is to maximize the probability that his objective is met. An optimal strategy for Player 1
guarantees that the objective is met with probability at least c and, intuitively, he cannot
do better, thus Player 2 has a strategy that guarantees that the objective is violated with
probability at least (1− c). It is well known that optimal positional strategies exist for the
objectives that we consider.
I Definition 3. (Values in stochastic games) Consider a bidding game G, let r ∈
[0, 1], and consider two optimal strategies f and g for the two players in RTBr(G). When
G is a qualitative game with objective O, the value of RTBr(G), denoted val(RTBr(G)), is
Prη∼D(f,g) Pr[η ∈ O]. When G is a mean-payoff game, the mean-payoff value of RTBr(G),
denoted MP(RTBr(G)), is Eη∈D(f,g)MP(η).
3 Qualitative Taxman Games
We start by describing the results on reachability bidding games.
I Theorem 4. [13] Consider a reachability bidding game G and a vertex v. The threshold
ratio exists in v with Richman, poorman, and taxman bidding. Moreover, threshold ratios
have the following properties. For the target vertex t of Player 1, we have Th(t) = 0. For
every vertex v from which there is no path to t, we have Th(v) = 1. Consider some other
vertex v and denote v+, v− ∈ N(v) the vertices for which Th(v−) ≤ Th(u) ≤ Th(v+), for
every u ∈ N(v).
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In Richman bidding, we have Th(v) = 12
(
Th(v+) + Th(v−)
)
. Moreover, Th(v) is a rational
number and satisfies Th(v) = 1− val(RTB(G), v).
In poorman bidding, we have Th(v) = Th(v+)/(1 + Th(v+)− Th(v−)).
In taxman bidding with parameter τ , we have Th(v) =
(
Th(v−)+Th(v+)−τ ·Th(v−))/(2−
τ · (1 + Th(v−)− Th(v+))).
It is shown in [4] and [5] that parity games with Richman and poorman bidding reduce
to reachability games. We show a similar result for taxman games. The crucial step is the
following lemma whose proof can be found in Appendix A.
I Lemma 5. Consider a taxman reachability game G that is played on the graph 〈V,E〉.
Suppose that every vertex in G has a path to the target of Player 1. Then, for any taxman
parameter τ and every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = 0. That is, Player 1 wins from v with any
positive initial budget.
Proof. Let n = |V | − 1 and t ∈ V be Player 1’s target. Suppose the game starts from a
vertex v, and let  > 0 be the initial budget of Player 1. Since there is a path from v to
Player 1’s target, there is a path of length at most n. Thus, if Player 1 wins n consecutive
biddings, he wins the game. Intuitively, Player 1 carefully chooses n increasing bids such
that if Player 2 wins one of these bids, Player 1’s ratio increases by a constant over his initial
budget. By repeatedly playing according to such a strategy, Player 1 guarantees that his
ratio increases and will eventually allow him to win n biddings in a row. Formally, if τ = 0,
then G is a Richman game and the proof of the lemma can be found in [4]. Otherwise, pick
a sufficiently large r ∈ IN such that τ > 2r−1 and r ≥ 3. Fix 0 < m < rn . Player 1 proceeds
as follows: after winning i times, for 0 ≤ i, he bids m · ri and, upon winning the bidding, he
moves towards t along any shortest path. Since m+mr + · · ·+mrn−1 < mrn < , Player 1
has sufficient budget to win n consecutive biddings. If Player 2 does not win any of the
first n biddings, Player 1 wins the game. On the other hand, if Player 2 wins the k-th
bidding with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we show in Appendix A that his ratio increases by a fixed amount
b = mr(1−)(r−1) > 0. J
Lemma 5 gives rise to simple reduction from parity taxman games to taxman reachability
games.
I Theorem 6. Parity taxman games are linearly reducible to taxman reachability games.
Specifically, threshold ratios exist in parity taxman games.
Proof. A bottom strongly-connected component (BSCC, for short) in G is a maximal subset
of vertices such that every two vertices have a path between them and no edges leave the set.
Lemma 5 ensures that when the game is in a BSCC, with any positive initial budget, a player
can force the game to reach any other vertex. A strategy that ensures infinitely many visits
to a vertex t splits a player’s budget into infinitely many positive parts and uses the i-th
part to force the game to visit t for the i-th time. Thus, a BSCC in which the highest parity
index is odd is “winning” for Player 1 and these in which the highest parity index is odd are
“losing” for Player 1. We then construct a reachability game by removing the BSCCs of the
game and playing a reachability game on the rest of the game, where Player 1’s targets are
his winning BSCCs. J
4 Mean-Payoff Taxman Games
This section consists of our main technical contribution. We start by showing a complete
classification of the value in strongly-connected mean-payoff taxman games depending on
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the taxman parameter τ and the initial ratio. We then extend the solution to general games,
where the solution to strongly-connected games constitutes the main ingredient in the solution
of the general case.
4.1 Strongly-Connected Mean-Payoff Taxman Games
We start by formally defining the value of a strongly-connected mean-payoff game. Lemma 5
implies that in a strongly-connected game, a player can draw the game from every vertex to
any other vertex with any positive initial budget. Since mean-payoff objectives are prefix
independent, it follows that the vertex from which the game starts does not matter. Indeed,
if the game starts at a vertex v with Max having initial ratio r + , then Max can use /2 of
his budget to draw the game to a vertex u and continue as if he starts the game with initial
ratio r + /2.
I Definition 7. (Mean-payoff value) Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game
G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a ratio r ∈ (0, 1) and a taxman parameter τ ∈ [0, 1]. The mean-payoff
value of G w.r.t. r and τ , is a value c ∈ IR such that for every  > 0
if Min’s initial ratio is greater than (1− r), then he has a strategy that guarantees that
the payoff is at most c+ , and
if Max’s initial ratio is greater than r, then he has a strategy that guarantees that the
payoff is greater than c− .
The following theorem, which we prove in the next two sections, summarizes the properties
of mean-payoff taxman games.
I Theorem 8. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff taxman game G with taxman
parameter τ ∈ [0, 1] and an initial ratio r ∈ (0, 1). The value of G w.r.t. τ and r equals
the value of the random-turn based game RTBF (τ,r)(G) in which Max is chosen to move with
probability F (τ, r) and Min with probability 1− F (τ, r), where F (τ, r) = r+τ(1−r)1+τ .
We show that in order to prove Theorem 8, it suffices to prove the following intermediate
lemma.
I Lemma 9. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff taxman game G, a taxman parameter
τ , and an initial ratio r ∈ (0, 1) such that MP(RTBF (τ,r)) = 0 for F (τ, r) = r+τ(1−r)1+τ . Then,
for every  > 0 Max has a strategy that guarantees that no matter how Min plays, the payoff
is greater than −.
Proof that Lemma 9 implies Theorem 8. First, we may assume that MP(RTBF (τ,r)) = 0
since we can decrease all weights by MP(RTBF (τ,r)). Recall that the definition of the payoff of
an infinite play pi = v1, v2, . . . is lim infn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 w(vi). Note that since the definition uses
lim inf, it gives Min an advantage. Constructing a strategy for Max is thus more challenging
and it implies a strategy for Min as follows. Let G′ be a mean-payoff game that is obtained
from G by multiplying all the weights by −1, and associate Min in G with Max in G′ and
vice-versa. Observe that MP(RTB1−
r+τ(1−r)
1+τ (G′)) = −MP(RTB r+τ(1−r)1+τ (G)) = 0. Thus, using a
strategy for Max in G′ that guarantees a payoff that is greater than − can be used by Min
to guarantee a payoff in G that is smaller than . J
4.2 The importance of moving
The first part of the construction of an optimal strategy for Max as in Lemma 9 is to
assign, to each vertex v ∈ V , a strength, denoted St(v), where St(v) ∈ Q≥0. Intuitively, if
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St(v) > St(u), for u, v ∈ V , it is more important for Max to move in v than it is in u. We
follow the construction in [5], which uses the concept of potentials, which is a well-known
concept in stochastic game (see [19]) and was originally defined in the context of the strategy
iteration algorithm [12]. For completeness, we present the definitions below.
Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G, and let p ∈ [0, 1]. Let f and g be two
optimal positional strategies in RTBp(G), for Min and Max, respectively. For a vertex v ∈ V ,
let v−, v+ ∈ V be such that Max proceeds from v to v+ according to g and Min proceeds
from v to v− according to f . It is not hard to see that the mean-payoff value in all vertices
in RTBp(G) is the same and we denote it by MP(RTBp(G)). We denote the potential of v by
Potp(v) and the strength of v by Stp(v), and we define them as follows.
Potp(v) = p · Potp(v+) + (1− p) · Potp(v−) + w(v)− MP(RTBp(G)) and
Stp(v) = p · (1− p) · (Potp(v+)− Potp(v−))
There are optimal strategies for which Potp(v−) ≤ Potp(v′) ≤ Potp(v+), for every v′ ∈ N(v),
which can be found, for example, using the strategy iteration algorithm. Note that St(v) ≥ 0,
for every v ∈ V .
Consider a finite path pi = v1, . . . , vn in G. We intuitively think of pi as a play, where for
every 1 ≤ i < n, the bid of Max in vi is St(vi) and he moves to v+i upon winning. Thus, if
vi+1 = v+i , we say that Max won in vi, and if vi+1 6= v+i , we say that Max lost in vi. Let
W (pi) and L(pi) respectively be the indices in which Max wins and loses in pi. We call Max
wins investments and Max loses gains, where intuitively he invests in increasing the energy
and gains a higher ratio of the budget whenever the energy decreases. Let G(pi) and I(pi)
be the sum of gains and investments in pi, respectively, thus G(pi) =
∑
i∈L(pi) St(vi) and
I(pi) =
∑
i∈W (pi) St(vi). Recall that the energy of pi is E(pi) =
∑
1≤i<n w(vi). The following
lemma, which generalizes a similar lemma in [5], connects the strength with the change in
energy.
I Lemma 10. Consider a strongly-connected game G, and p ∈ [0, 1]. For every finite
path pi = v1, . . . , vn in G, we have Potp(v1) − Potp(vn) + (n − 1) · MP(RTBp(G)) ≤ E(pi) +
G(pi)/(1− p)− I(pi)/p. In particular, when p = ν/(µ+ ν) for ν, µ > 0, there is a constant
P = minv Potp(v)−maxv Potp(v) such that ν·µν+µ ·
(
E(pi)− P − (n− 1) · MP(RTB νµ+ν (G))) ≥
µ · I(pi)− ν ·G(pi).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of pi. For n = 1, the claim is trivial since
both sides of the equation are 0. Suppose the claim is true for all paths of length n − 1
and we prove it for a path pi = v1, . . . , vn+1 of length2 n. We consider the case when Max
wins in v1 thus v2 = v+1 . The case when Min wins in v1 is proved similarly. Let pi′ be the
part of path pi starting in v2. Since Max wins the first bidding, we have G(pi′) = G(pi),
I(pi′) = I(pi) + Stp(v). Hence, by induction hypothesis we have
E(pi) +G(pi)/(1− p)− I(pi)/p ≥ E(pi′) +G(pi′)/(1− p)− I(pi′)/p+ w(v1)− Stp(v1)/p
≥ Potp(v+1 )− Potp(vn+1) + (n− 1) · MP(RTBp(G)) + w(v1)− Stp(v1)/p
= Potp(v+1 )− Potp(vn+1) + (n− 1) · MP(RTBp(G)) + w(v1)− (1− p) · (Potp(v+1 )− Potp(v−1 ))
= p · Potp(v+1 ) + (1− p) · Potp(v−1 ) + w(v1)− Potp(vn+1) + (n− 1) · MP(RTBp(G))
= Potp(v1)− Potp(vn+1) + n · MP(RTBp(G)).
J
2 The weight of the last vertex does not participate in the energy calculation, thus the length of a path
that traverses n+ 1 vertices has length n.
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4.3 Normalizing the bids
Once we have figured out how important each vertex is, the second challenge in the construc-
tion of Max’s strategy is to wisely use his budget such that the changes in the ratios between
the players’ budgets coincides with the changes in the accumulated energy. Intuitively,
Lemma 11 below gives us a recipe to normalize the bids: whenever we reach a vertex v, Max
bids r · (1− r) · St(v) · βx, where βx is the normalization factor and x ∈ IR≥1 ties between
changes in energy and changes in Max’s ratio, as elaborated after the lemma.
I Lemma 11. Consider a game G, a finite set of non-negative strengths S ⊆ IR≥0, a ratio
r ∈ (0, 1), and a taxman parameter τ ∈ [0, 1]. For every K > τr2+r(1−r)τ(1−r)2+r(1−r) there exist
sequences (rx)x≥1 and (βx)x≥1 with the following properties.
1. Max’s bid does not exceed his budget, thus, for each position x ∈ IR≥1 and strength s ∈ S,
we have βx · s · r · (r − 1) < rx.
2. Min cannot force the game beyond position 1, thus for every s ∈ S\{0} and 1 ≤ x < 1+rs,
we have βx · s · r · (r − 1) > 1− rx.
3. The ratios tend to r from above, thus for every x ∈ IR≥1, we have rx ≥ r, and limx→∞ rx =
r.
4. No matter who wins a bidding, Max’s ratio can only improve. Thus, in case of winning
and in case of losing, we respectively have
rx − βx · s · r · (r − 1)
1− (1− τ) · βx · s · r · (r − 1) ≥ rx+(1−r)·K·s and
rx + τ · βx · s · r · (r − 1)
1− (1− τ) · βx · s · r · (r − 1) ≥ rx−s·r
We first show how Lemma 11 implies Theorem 8.
Proof that Lemma 11 implies Lemma 9. Fix  > 0, we construct strategy for Max guaran-
teeing a payoff greater than −, as wanted. Observe that
r
r + (1− r) τr2+r(1−r)τ(1−r)2+r(1−r)
= r(τ(1− r) + r)
τr(1− r) + r2 + τr2 + r(1− r) =
r + τ(1− r)
1 + τ = F (τ, r).
Thus, since by assumption MP(RTBF (τ,r)(G)) = 0 and MP(RTBp(G)) is a continuous function in
p ∈ [0, 1] [8, 21], we can pick K > F (τ, r) such that MP(RTB rr+(1−r)K (G)) > −.
We now describe Max’s strategy. We think of the change in Max’s ratio as a walk on IR≥1.
Each position x ∈ IR≥1 is associated with a ratio rx. The walk starts in a position x0 such
that Max’s initial ratio is at least rx0 . Let ν = r and µ = K(1− r). Suppose the token is
placed on a vertex v ∈ V . Then, Max’s bid is r · (1− r) · βx · St(v) (when ratios of Max and
Min are normalized to sum up to 1) and he proceeds to v+ upon winning. If Max wins, the
walk proceeds up µ · St(v) steps to x+ µSt(v), and if he loses, the walk proceeds down to
x− νSt(v). Suppose Min fixes some strategy and let pi = v1, . . . , vn be a finite prefix of the
play that is generated by the two strategies. Suppose the walk following pi reaches x ∈ IR.
Then, using the terminology of the previous section, we have x = x0 −G(pi) · ν + I(pi) · µ.
Lemma 11 shows that the walk always stays above 1, thus x ≥ 1. Combining with Lemma 10,
we get ν+µν·µ (1− x0) + P + (n− 1) · MP(RTB
ν
ν+µ (G)) ≤ E(pi). Thus, dividing both sides by n
and letting n → ∞, since x0 and P are constants depending only on K we conclude that
this strategy guarantees payoff at least MP(RTB
ν
ν+µ (G)) > −. J
We continue to prove Lemma 11.
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Proof of Lemma 11. Note that τr
2+r(1−r)
τ(1−r)2+r(1−r) is well-defined for r ∈ (0, 1). Fix τ ∈ [0, 1]
and r ∈ (0, 1). Let K > τr2+r(1−r)τ(1−r)2+r(1−r) . Observe that the two inequalities in Point 4 are
equivalent to:
rx−rs − rx ≤ τr(1− r)βxs+ (1− τ)r(1− r)βxsrx−rs,
rx − rx+K(1−r)s ≥ r(1− r)βxs− (1− τ)r(1− r)βxsrx+K(1−r)s.
Point 3 combined with monotonicity in the above expressions, implies that we can replace
the last term in each of them by r in order to obtain stronger inequalities. Therefore, it
suffices for (rx)x≥1 and (βx)x≥1 to satisfy
rx−rs − rx ≤ τr(1− r)βxs+ (1− τ)r(1− r)βxsr,
rx − rx+K(1−r)s ≥ r(1− r)βxs− (1− τ)r(1− r)βxsr,
which is equivalent to
rx−rs − rx ≤ r(1− r)βxs[τ + (1− τ)r],
rx − rx+K(1−r)s ≥ r(1− r)βxs[1− (1− τ)r]. (1)
We seek (rx)x≥1 and (βx)x≥1 in the form rx = γx−1 + (1− γx−1)r and βx = βγx−1 for some
γ, β ∈ (0, 1). Note that this choice ensures Points 1 and 3. Therefore, we just need to show
that we can find γ, β ∈ [0, 1] for which the inequalities in (1) hold for any s ∈ S. Substituting
rx and βx in terms of γ and β, the inequalities in (1) reduce to
rx−rs − rx = γx−1(γ−rs − 1)(1− r)
?≤ βγx−1r(1− r)s[τ + (1− τ)r],
rx − rx+K(1−r)s = γx−1(1− γK(1−r)s)(1− r)
?≥ βγx−1r(1− r)s[1− (1− τ)r].
First, when s = 0, both sides of both inequalities are equal to 0 so both inequalities clearly
hold. Recall that S is a finite set of non-negative strengths. Thus, when s > 0, it takes
values in 0 < s1 ≤ . . . ≤ sn, and the above inequalities are equivalent to
γ ≥ (1 + βrs[τ + (1− τ)r])− 1rs ,
γ ≤ (1− βrs[1− (1− τ)r]) 1K(1−r)s . (2)
Since both of these expressions are in (0, 1), to conclude that γ, β ∈ (0, 1) exist, it suffices to
show that there is some β ∈ (0, 1) such that
max
s∈{s1,...,sn}
(
1 + βrs[τ + (1− τ)r])− 1rs ≤ min
s∈{s1,...,sn}
(
1− βrs[1− (1− τ)r]) 1K(1−r)s . (3)
Note that the LHS of (3) is monotonically increasing in s > 0 whereas the RHS is monoton-
ically decreasing in s > 0, therefore it suffices to find β ∈ (0, 1) for which
(
1 + βrsn[τ + (1− τ)r]
)− 1rsn ≤ (1− βrs1[1− (1− τ)r]) 1K(1−r)s1 . (4)
By Taylor’s theorem (1 + y)α = 1 + αy + O(y2), so Taylor expanding both sides of (4) in
β > 0 we get(
1 + βrsn[τ + (1− τ)r]
)− 1rsn = 1− β[τ + (1− τ)r] +O(β2),(
1− βrs1[1− (1− τ)r]
) 1
K(1−r)s1 = 1− β r
K(1− r) [1− (1− τ)r] +O(β
2).
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Therefore, if we show that [τ + (1− τ)r] > rK(1−r) [1− (1− τ)r], the linear coefficient of β
on the LHS of (4) will be strictly smaller than the linear coefficient of β on the RHS. Thus,
for sufficiently small β > 0, (4) will hold, which concludes the proof of the lemma. This
condition is equivalent to
K >
r[1− (1− τ)r]
(1− r)[τ + (1− τ)r] =
r[τr + (1− r)]
(1− r)[τ(1− r) + r] =
τr2 + r(1− r)
τ(1− r)2 + r(1− r) ,
which is true by assumption. Thus, Points 1, 3, and 4 hold. In Appendix B, we show that
Point 2 holds. J
4.4 General Mean-Payoff Taxman Games
We extend the solution to general games. Recall that the threshold ratio in mean-payoff
games is a necessary and sufficient initial ratio with which Max can guarantee a payoff of at
least 0.
I Theorem 12. Threshold ratios exist in mean-payoff taxman games.
Proof. Consider a mean-payoff taxman game G = 〈V,E,w〉 with taxman parameter τ . If
G is strongly-connected, then by Theorem 8, the threshold ratio in all vertices in G is the
same and is r ∈ (0, 1) for r such that MP(RTBF (τ,r)(G)) = 0. If no such r exists, then either
MP(RTBF (τ,1)(G)) < 0, in which case the threshold ratios are 1, or MP(RTBF (τ,0)(G)) > 0, in
which case the threshold ratios are 0. The proof for general games follows along the same
lines as the proof for reachability games. For each bottom strongly-connected component
Si of G we find the threshold ratio ri ∈ (0, 1) as in the above. We play a “generalized”
reachability game on G as follows. The game ends once the token reaches one of the BSCCs
in G. Max wins the game iff the first time the game enters a BSCC Si, Max’s ratio is greater
than ri. Showing existence of threshold ratios in the generalized game follows the same
argument as for reachability games [13]. J
5 Computational Complexity
We show, for the first time, computational complexity results for taxman games. We study the
following problem, which we call THRESH: given a taxman game G with taxman parameter
τ and a vertex v0 in G, decide whether Th(v0) ≥ 0.5. The correspondence in Theorem 8 gives
the second part of the following theorem, and for the first part, in Appendix C, we show a
reduction from THRESH to the existential theory of the reals [7].
I Theorem 13. For taxman reachability, parity, and mean-payoff games THRESH is in
PSPACE. For strongly-connected mean-payoff games, THRESH is in NP ∩ coNP.
6 Discussion
We study, for the first time, infinite-duration taxman bidding games, which span the
spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding. For qualitative objectives, we show
that the properties of taxman coincide with these of Richman and poorman bidding. For
mean-payoff games, where Richman and poorman bidding have an elegant though surprisingly
different mathematical structure, we show a complete understanding of taxman games. Our
study of mean-payoff taxman games sheds light on these differences and similarities between
the two bidding rules. Unlike previous proof techniques, which were ad-hoc, we expect
our technique to be easier to generalize beyond taxman games, where they can be used to
introduce concepts like multi-players or partial information into bidding games.
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A Proof of Lemma 5
If Player 2 wins the k-th bidding with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, then the new ratio is
−m−mr − · · · −mrk−1 + τmrk
1− + τm+ τmr + · · ·+ τmrk−1 −mrk =
−m rk−1r−1 + τmrk
1− + τm rk−1r−1 −mrk
>
+mrk(τ − 1r−1 )
1− −mrk(1− τr−1 )
>
+mrk(τ − 1r−1 )
1− 
τ> 2r−1
>

1−  +
mrk
(1− )(r − 1)
≥ 1−  +
mr
(1− )(r − 1) ,
Thus, the ratio increases by a fixed amount b = mr(1−)(r−1) > 0. Let 1 be the new (normalized)
ratio of Player 1. Since 0 < m < rn <
1
rn , Player 1 can repeat the same process and again
either win the game in at most n steps or increase his budget ratio by at least b. Note that
mr
(1−)(r−1) is an increasing function of . Proceeding like this, eventually either Player 1 wins
the game, or his normalized budget exceeds 1− 2−n, in which case he can win n consecutive
biddings by bidding 2−n, 2−n+1, . . . , 2−1.
B Proof of Lemma 11
We conclude by showing that Point 2 holds. Let s ∈ S \{0} and 1 ≤ x < 1+rs. Intuitively, if
Min wins the bidding, we reach a position that is less than 1. We show that 1−rx < sr(1−r)βx,
therefore proving that Min has insufficient budget to win this bid. Taking (γx)x≥1 and
(βx)x≥1 as in the above, we have 1 − rx = (1 − γx−1)(1 − r) and βx = βγx−1. Hence it
suffices to prove that γx−1 > 11+srβ . As x− 1 < sr and γ ∈ (0, 1), we have γx−1 > γsr. On
the other hand, we established (2), thus as [τ + (1 − τ)r] ≤ 1 and srβ ≥ 0, we conclude
γsr ≥ 11+srβ[τ+(1−τ)r] ≥ 11+srβ .
C Proof of Theorem 13
For strongly-connected mean-payoff games, the theorem follows from Theorem 8 and the
fact that solving stochastic mean-payoff games is in NP ∩ coNP [22]. In the other cases, we
reduce THRESH to the existential theory of the reals, which is known to be in PSPACE [7].
We describe the solution for reachability games and the reduction for the other objectives is
similar. We start by guessing, for each v ∈ V , two vertices v+ and v−. For each vertex v,
we introduce a variable xv. The constraints we use are the following. For the target t ∈ V
of Player 1, we add a constraint xt = 0. For every v ∈ V from which there is no path to
t, we add xv = 1. For every other vertex v, we add constraints xv− ≤ xu ≤ xv+ , for every
u ∈ N(v), and a constraint xv =
(
xv− + xv+ − τ · xv−
)
/
(
2− τ · (1 + xv− − xv+)
)
. Finally,
for the initial vertex v0, we add a constraint xv0 ≥ 1/2. By Theorem 4, the program has a
solution iff Th(v0) ≥ 0.5, and we are done.
